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The literature on Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) returnees in Acholiland, northern
Uganda tells us that thosewho returned from the rebel group are likely to experience
stigma and social exclusion. While the term is deployed frequently, ‘stigma’ is not a
well-developed concept and most of the evidence we have comes from accounts of
returnees themselves. Focusing instead on the ‘stigmatizers’, this article theorizes
stigmatization as part of the ‘moral experience’ of regulating post-war social repair.
Through interview-based and ethnographic methods, it finds that stigmatization of
LRAreturnees takesmany formsandservesmultiple functions, calling intoquestion
whether this catch-all termactually obscuresmore than it illuminates.While stigma-
tization is usually practised as a form of ‘social control’, its function can be ‘reinte-
grative’ rather than purely exclusionary. Through the northern Uganda case study,
this article seeks to advance conceptual and empirical understanding of themanifes-
tations and functions of stigmatization in spaces of return, challenging the logic
underpinning those interventions that seek to reduce it.
Keywords: Displacement, reintegration, return, social repair, Uganda
Introduction
Over 10 years since the end of the war between the Lord’sResistanceArmy (LRA)
and the Government of Uganda (GoU), numerous studies argue that those who
have returned from the LRA, often having been forcibly abducted by the group,
face severe and punishing forms of ‘stigmatization’ in the context of their daily
lives.1 Despite being widely used, the term ‘stigma’ is rarely defined or concep-
tualized. It has become shorthand for everything from name-calling and finger-
pointing to violent attacks and systematic exclusion from economic resources.
Most accounts we have come from individual experiences of LRA returnees,
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leaving us without clear understanding of what Kleinman and Hall-Clifford
(2009: 418) call the ‘unique social and cultural processes that create stigma in
the lived worlds of the stigmatised’. With a focus on northern Uganda, this article
seeks to address this gap in order to contribute to a fuller understanding of how
stigmatization of ‘complex political perpetrators’ (Baines 2009) functions in tur-
bulent spaces of return.
The article starts from the premise that stigma ‘is the mark, the condition, or
status that is subject to devaluation’ (Pescosolido and Martin 2015: 91).
‘Stigmatization’, meanwhile, ‘is the social process by which the mark affects the
lives of all those touched by it’ (ibid.). Adopting frameworks proposed by
Kleinman and colleagues, the argument follows that stigmatization of LRA retur-
nees is embedded in the ‘moral experience’ of post-war social suffering and repair.
Moral experience is understood as the intersubjective flow of ‘practices, negotia-
tions’ and ‘contestations’ among those with ‘whom we are connected’ (Kleinman
1998: 358–359). Moral experience is not abstract or static. It is rooted in ‘posi-
tioned views and practice’, ‘situated relationships’ and specific places that are
always in flux (ibid.: 365). The stakes are always high because they involve delib-
eration and contestation around things that, by anymeasure, ‘matter greatly’, be it
‘status, relationships, resources, ultimate meanings, one’s being-in-the-world, and
one’s being-unto-death and transcendence’ (ibid.: 362). Stigmatization of LRA
returnees, this article argues, is best understood as something that can happen as
part of the ‘moral experience’ of everyday engagements, rooted in social and
cultural practices, norms and negotiations that seek to (re)construct and (re)ima-
gine a sense of ‘normality’—however contested—in the aftermath of abduction,
violence and mass displacement.
Adopting a ‘moral experience’ lens, findings suggest that all LRA returnees, by
virtue of time spent with the rebel group, may possess stigma but this will not
always lead them to be stigmatized and, even if they are, this takes a variety of
forms and may serve multiple functions, ranging from rejection to resocialization.
The findings presented here call into question whether this catch-all term actually
obscures more than it illuminates. This has important policy implications too: if
stigmatization is understood as a multifaceted expression and manifestation of
social suffering and repair, then efforts to reduce it cannot rely on one-
dimensional ‘awareness’ and ‘education’ campaigns, which, as in other contexts,
have failed to have a discernible impact (Pescosolido et al. 2010; Pescosolido and
Martin 2015: 105).
This study of LRA returnees and stigma departs from previous studies in two
important ways. First, it explores stigmatization through the perspective of the
stigmatizers. As such, it focuses on the dynamics of stigmatization in the context
of post-war village life, where the majority of returnees have resettled. Despite the
disruption created by mass displacement, the villages today are once again close-
knit social settings shaped both by cooperation and contestation. These are ‘com-
munities’ in so far as people share kinship links and relationships are based on
shared economic and social activities, such as collective farming, and savings and
loans groups. Yet, as Heald (1998: 212) notes, ‘the neighbourhood’ is also ‘the
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sphere of the most embittered enemies, where conflicts over land, women and
breaches of norms are most evident and serious’.
Second, this study is concerned with understanding the stigmatization of a
numerically large, but relatively under-researched group: those male returnees
believed to have been forcibly abducted.2 Existing studies overwhelmingly focus
on abducted girls and women and their children who were ‘born in captivity’,
often as a result of forced sexual relationships.3 The social and moral issues
presented by the return of these women and children places almighty stress on
the normative foundations of this patrilineal, patrilocal society. Without formal
claims to land, their very presence represents a profound and particular moral and
social burden on extended families. In a society with clearly defined gender roles,
the situation is not necessarily the same for male returnees, notwithstanding the
fact that this is a highly heterogeneous group. A focus on howmale returnees have
been received home—thus far understudied—therefore advances our understand-
ing of the complex dynamics of stigmatization in spaces of ‘return’ in post-war
northern Uganda.
This study is based on both authors’ long-term ethnographic and interview-
based research in Acholiland since 2010 on topics of post-war justice, forgiveness,
revenge and community security. Specifically, it draws upon research conducted
between 2018 and 2019 in four villages in Gulu district: three rural and one peri-
urban. This involved a set of 40 in-depth semi-structured interviews with commu-
nity members (10 in each location); six focus-group discussions with community
members across research sites (n20 each); and 20 in-depth semi-structured inter-
views with village authority figures, including rwodi (chiefs), local councillors
(LC1), religious leaders, clan elders, atekere (clan ritual leaders) and chairpersons
of village savings and loans groups.
The article begins with a review of the theoretical literature on stigmatization.
Conceptual and empirical gaps are identified that justify an everyday and rela-
tional approach to understanding its manifestations. Vernacular understandings
of the term ‘stigma’ and the social politics of ‘being normal’ are then explored in
the post-war Acholi context. Against this, three existential, sometimes interlock-
ing, processes of social deliberation and contestation are identified that render
LRA returnees vulnerable to ‘disqualification’ from ‘full social acceptance’
(Goffman 1963: 9). Viewed through the lens of ‘moral experience’, the first is
the process of judging whether individual behaviour of the returnee is considered
‘good’, meaning economically productive and respectful to others; second is
whether the returnee is thought to have come back from the LRAwith bad spirits
(cen) that will ‘contaminate’ the local environs; and third is the process of securing
and defending resources in the context of post-displacement political economies of
survival, particularly in relation to land.
The argument follows that, because it happens for different reasons, stigma-
tization serves a range of functions. Often it is deliberately exclusionary, rooted in
rejection, even the desire for expulsion from village life. In other instances, it is
based on cultural ideas related to the importance of cleansing and/or shame in
resocializing individuals after wrongdoing and is reintegrative in purpose. Uniting
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this, stigmatization functions as a form of resistance to hegemonic discourses
around amnesty, forgiveness and anti-stigma interventions, and as away of people
and communities expressing some agency—even humanity—in those spaces
where LRA returnees have ‘come home’.
Understanding Stigmatization as a ‘Social Process’ and as a ‘Moral
Experience’
In 1963, the sociologist Erving Goffman published a study: Stigma: Notes on the
Management of a Spoiled Identity. To possess ‘stigma’, he argued, was to possess
an ‘attribute that is deeply discrediting’, while to stigmatize was to categorize this
‘undesired differentness’, usually in relation to the ‘unconscious expectations and
norms which act as unseen arbiters in all social encounters’ (1963: 13–15).
Amongst Goffman’s major contributions to the theorization of stigma was the
dynamic and circular relationship between the noun (stigma) and the verb (to
stigmatize). It was, he argued, a socially constructed, ‘special kind of relationship’,
which takes formwhen there is a perceived gap between the ‘virtual social identity’
and the ‘actual social identity’, the former constituting societies’ normative expect-
ations about individual behaviour and the latter representing ‘the attributes really
possessed by a person’ (Goffman 1963: 12; Yang et al. 2007: 1525).
Since then, there have been scores of studies on stigma, but very little empirical or
conceptual development of Goffman’s important premise that ‘stigmatisation can
be enacted only through social relations’ (Pescosolido andMartin 2015: 91). Social
psychologists andmicrosociologists working in the subfield of symbolic interaction-
ism have dominated research, focusing on how individuals cognitively process
stigma and how best to promote more tolerance towards conditions that are stig-
matised.4 Both approaches have been critiqued for isolating ‘stigma’s broader effect
within the individual stigmatizer or recipient’, rather than examining its wider social
sources and processes (Yang et al. 2007: 1527–1528; Link and Phelan 2001; Parker
and Aggleton 2003 see also Tyler and Slater 2018: 729–731; and Hannem 2012).
Recent sociological research has addressed this through studies examining how
the institutionalization of power relationships—social, economic and political—
determines the transmission of stigma.5 While this new focus on ‘looking up’
(Hannem 2012; cf. Tyler and Slater 2018: 731) to the structural and structuring
factors that generate stigma is important, gaps in our knowledge remain. Studies
are Western-centric, focusing on how state institutions and political discourse
generate and re-enforce stigma’s discriminatory impacts. In northern Uganda,
where state institutions are peripheral and/or lack authority and legitimacy, we
need first to understand how stigma is ‘embedded’ in ‘local worlds’, ‘moral modes’
and ‘relational networks’ (Yang et al. 2007: 1528; Kleinman and Hall-Clifford
2009). As Johnson argues, ‘glimpses of stigma as lived experience’ in such contexts
‘are all too rare’ (2012: 633). In her study of HIV-positive women in ruralMalawi,
for example, she finds that the concept ‘serves us ill as a descriptor of the experi-
ences of HIV-positive people if it is not related to the social situations in which
particular lives unfold’ (2010: 647).
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Bringing some coherence to psychological and sociological explanations, the
anthropologist Arthur Kleinman and colleagues suggest that stigmatization is
best conceptualized as part of ‘moral experience’ (Yang et al. 2007). Experience,
here is understood ethnographically as ‘the felt flow of interpersonal communi-
cation and engagements’ that is ‘thoroughly intersubjective’ and takes place in a
‘local world’ that is culturally, socially, economically and politically specific
(Kleinman 1998: 358). It is ‘moral’ because it refers to deliberation and contest-
ations around ‘a set of social norms and obligations that constitute what is most
important to people living in a particular community’ or ‘what matters most for
ordinary men and women’ who have ‘important things to lose, to gain, and to
preserve’ (Kleinman 1998: 362; Kleinman 2006; Yang et al. 2007: 1528, emphasis
added).6 In contexts of social suffering, defined as ‘the trauma, pain and disorders
to which atrocity gives rise’ that defy neat biomedical or legal categorization
(Kleinman et al. 1997: ix), a moral experience perspective on stigmatization takes
us back to Goffman’s language of relationships allowing us to better understand:
those doing the stigmatizing, for it allows us to see [them] as interpreting, living and
reacting with regard to what is vitally at stake and what is most crucially threatened
(Yang et al. 2007: 1530, emphasis added).
Further, unless we examine stigma through this lens, we risk presenting a very
‘formulaic’ notion because:
stigmatizing someone is not solely a response to sociological determinants or a
deeply interpretative endeavour played out in a cultural unconscious. It is also a
highly pragmatic, even tactical response to perceived threats, real dangers and fear
of the unknown (ibid.: 1528).
This is the approach followed in this article. Stigma and stigmatization are ana-
lysed as moral experience in those quotidian post-war spaces in which relation-
ships and communities are being reconstructed, and in which war has ended but
violence and social suffering endure.
The LRA War, Social Suffering and Anti-stigma Interventions
Thewar began in northernUganda in 1986 and, soon after, theAcholi-based rebel
group, the Lord’s Resistance Army, began fighting the new National Resistance
Movement (NRM) government, headed by President Museveni. The NRM/A
was conducting a brutal military campaign to suppress opposition in the north
of the country7 and the leader of the LRA, Joseph Kony, drew upon a repertoire
of metaphysical beliefs, combining Christian and traditional cosmologies in a
sustained insurgency that remained in Acholiand and other regions of the
greater north, including Lango, West Nile and Teso. Kony’s contention that
the NRM was intent on ‘destroying’ the Acholi resonated widely but this did
not translate into popular support for the LRA’s methods, so the high command
became increasingly reliant on abduction to fill its ranks (Schomerus 2010: 121).
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The data on LRA abduction rates during the war (1987–2008) is patchy. A
study examining records of nine NGO-led reception centres8 for formerly
abducted persons calculated figures ranging from 24,000 to 38,000 children and
youth, and 28,000–37,000 adults (PhamandVinck 2007: 1).We do not knowwhat
happened to everyone in the LRA. Those who did not die or go missing were
either captured by the Ugandan army during battles or managed to escape. By
2007, it was estimated that more than 20,000 children and youth had been proc-
essed through the reception centres but this number does not include ‘the thou-
sands’ who were not, nor does it include ‘adults who left the LRA and have
returned to civilian life’ (Pham and Vinck 2007: 1).
A large majority of those abducted were exposed to, but also perpetrated, ex-
tremely violent acts, sometimes against their own neighbours and familymembers
(Annan et al. 2006; Pham and Vinck 2007). They have complex identities as ‘vic-
tim-perpetrators’ and, on their return, communities had to ‘reconcile’ the terrible
experiences of the abductees with their own suffering at the hands of the LRA and
the GoU (Baines 2009: 166–167). With up to 90 per cent of the Acholi population
forcibly displaced at the height of the conflict in the early 2000s, LRA returnees
were mostly ‘re-integrated into settings of chronic crisis’ (ibid.). Life in the IDP
camps has been conceptualized as ‘social torture’, perpetrated by the state ‘on a
mass rather than an individual scale’ (Dolan 2009: 1).
In response to the complexity of the situation, the Amnesty Act was passed in
2000, after a long campaign by Acholi religious, political and cultural leaders. In
theory, it provides an amnesty certificate to any LRAmember willing to renounce
conflict and surrender weapons. The act also established an Amnesty
Commission, to ‘encourage communities to reconcile with those who have com-
mitted the offences’ (Hovil and Lomo 1994: 7). According to the Commission,
roughly 13,650 certificates have been issued to ‘former LRA abductees’.9 The act
itself uses the word ‘forgiveness’ to describe its rationale and, in Acholi, the same
word, timo kica, is used to denote both the amnesty and forgiveness. Forgiveness
then became closely associated with the moral authority of religious leaders, but
also the institutional power of the state.
TheAmnestyCommission’s ‘resettlement’ and ‘reintegration’ functionwas large-
ly outsourced to non-governmental organization (NGO)-administered reception
centres and overseen by regional District Peace and Reconciliation Teams
(DPRTs). Anti-stigma ‘sensitizations’ were conducted in camps, and later in reset-
tled villages, and over the radio waves. These described LRA returnees as innocent
children, forcibly abducted and devoid of agency during time spent in the bush. It
was not just forgiveness being promoted; it was also an appeal to forget. Senior
DPRT staff explained: ‘we don’t want them to remember.’ As part of the effort to
‘train the community to accept people back to ensure less rejection,’ one explained:
We tell them that the former abductees were forced to do atrocities in their own
communities and that time heals. DPRT is supposed to neutralise people’s minds
about revenge. We are trying to neutralise the minds of the community.10
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NGOs running the reception centres and the religious leadership under the banner
of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) re-enforced this mes-
sage. As a World Vision staff member explained:
sometimes the community will realize that the boy has worked in the area . . . then
they realize, it is this boywhokilledmy relatives. In that kind of situationwe bring in
the religious leaders, they will bring in Christianity and call for forgiveness and we
will ask those people that are resisting: ‘what if hewas your son’?11 (emphasis added)
Despite this, since 2004, the Amnesty has coexisted awkwardly with the GoU’s
decision to refer the ‘LRA situation’ to the International Criminal Court. The
investigation resulted in arrest warrants for the LRA’s five top commanders.12
The subsequent setting-up of Uganda’s International Crimes Division in 2008 re-
intensified legal and political tensions around the relationship between amnesty
and prosecution—a debate that severely disrupted its only war-crimes trial to
date. Other transitional justice mechanisms, designed to break down the dichot-
omy between amnesty and prosecution, were inscribed into an Agreement on
Accountability and Reconciliation (AAR), signed by LRA/M and the GoU del-
egations during the Juba Peace Talks in 2007. In addition to the establishment of
the ICD, these recommended a ‘truth body’, a range of ‘traditional reconciliation’
processes and reparations. The Agreement was supposed to form the basis of a
National Transitional Justice Policy but, due to a lack of political will at the level
of the executive, over 10 years later, most people in Acholiland have had sporadic
or non-existent experience with kinds of processes outlined in the AAR.
Rather thanmeta-narratives of anti-stigma, forgiveness and transitional justice,
the best place to begin interpreting how Acholi society is coping after war are
everyday ‘co-existence situations’ (Prieto 2012). Since decommissioning of the
camps and a return to villages or resettlement elsewhere, the legacy of the war
looms large. Our respondents readily acknowledged that returnees were abducted
against their will. But, while they rarely blamed them openly for wrongdoing
committed while in the bush, they strongly maintained the moral authority to
both judge and manage the moral implications of that wrongdoing in the present.
As Baines (2009: 166) argues:
When violent conflict becomes a ‘normal’ part of everyday life, people struggle to
redefine themselves and their relationships within that landscape . . .. Social and
spiritual problems are attributed to the presence of former combatants and so the
community copes bymarking out their presence throughmarginalisation, exclusion
and purification or cleansing.
Stigmatization is a form of social accountability and control that happens in all
those coping processes and it does not map neatly onto the ‘implicit teleological
temporality’ of anti-stigma and transitional justice discourses (Mueller-Hirth and
Oyola 2018: 3). It is rooted in a broad repertoire of social norms and cultural
practices, including, but not limited to, ideas about the spirit world. Its manifests
as part of the moral experience of ‘govern[ing] the lived surroundings’ (Finnstro¨m
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2008: 26). In the next section, this argument is developed by examining the concept
of stigma and stigmatization in the Acholi vernacular.
Stigma and Stigmatization in Acholi Culture and Language
Whereas the etymology of stigma emphasizes physical manifestations of perceived
deviance: ‘mark made by a pointed instrument’, the terms used in Acholi focus on
the act of stigmatization itself. The most common terms are embodied: cimo tok,
meaning to point at someone’s back, or kwoto lawoti, which literally means ‘per-
son who walks with you’ but translates as to gossip about someone. The two
quotes below are illustrative:
Stigma is gossiping, talking something bad where you point at that person, talk
about a person and that person will be hurt because of it.13
Stigma is like, when I am passing by, someone will say, you see him, walking there?
He stayed in the bush. That is stigmatisation because some people might not have
known I stayed in the bush.14
The most commonly used ‘ill words’ were dwog cen paco, meaning ‘return back
home’, which became pejorative slang for LRA returnees and olum, olum obino
gang, meaning ‘the rebels have returned home from the bush’. Other terms were
used that related to possession by bad spirits.
As Phelan and Link (2014: 25) note in other contexts, ‘people know it is not
socially acceptable to stigmatize others’. The English word ‘stigma’ first came into
popular usage in response to the HIV/AIDs epidemic and latterly in anti-stigma
programmes designed to educate populations about the need (moral and statu-
tory) to reintegrate LRA returnees. As such, the word ‘stigma’ is linked in people’s
minds to authoritative efforts to combat it. Agreement lay in the fact stigma
happens in the shadows, lapiny lapiny, meaning ‘in secret’, and that it was not a
‘proper’ way of acting towards someone. Often, to stigmatize was associated pe-
joratively with ‘feminine behaviours’ in polygamous households, where finger-
pointing and gossiping were said to occur regularly between jealous co-wives.15 It
was also linked to ‘drunkenness’, where your ability to exercise restraint is com-
promised. Stigmatization, then, was understood as embedded in social relation-
ships even if it sat uncomfortably with idealized social mores. It was widely
disparaged, but also widely practised.
As with discussion of any social practice, the conceptual boundaries of stigma
and stigmatization are broad. In this sense, two important nuances emerged. First,
while stigmatization was commonly described as ‘a very bad and painful act of
disregarding someone’, many people also had a more neutral understanding of it
as singling out an individual for any reason, be it good or bad: literally just talking
about someone when they are not present. According to one woman:
We can say it is stigmatisation because you extended your fingers but I would see it
as having a discussion or sharing ... such talks are inevitable, they are things that
happen.16
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Because the definition of stigma was interpreted so broadly—talking about some-
one behind their back—most people, returnees or not, recounted personal experi-
ences of stigmatization. The second important point (developed more below) is
that it was not the shame that stigma conferred on the stigmatized that was ne-
cessarily at issue; it was the mode of communication (doing it behind their back)
that was regarded as not ideal.
As Theidon (2018: 153) argues in relation to the distressing names given to
children born of war across many contexts,
the concept of stigma is frequently applied to these children, yet is that really all we
can say about these names? Stigma seems a thin explanation for a thick phenom-
enon, and forecloses a broader repertoire of potential meanings and motivations.
While this is certainly true in our context, so too is the opposite. Often, the word
‘stigma’ is used to describe behaviour that is not ultimately designed to reject or to
exclude. As we demonstrate below, this re-emphasizes the importance of under-
standing the social processes underpinning stigmatization.
Stigma and the Social Politics of ‘Being Normal’ in Post-war Acholiland
While there is little agreement on whether returnees should be blamed or punished
for crimes and moral transgressions committed in the LRA, there is consensus
that, on return, their individual behaviour must be ‘normal’ and, relatedly, their
presence must be conducive to the ‘normal’ functioning of social and economic
relationships and spiritual balance. Those returnees who transgress the bounda-
ries of ‘normal’ male behaviour, or pose a threat to normality, are likely to ex-
perience stigmatization.
So what does it mean to be ‘normal’? In Acholi society, there exist strong (albeit
contested) normative ideals and moral boundaries, which imbue relationships
with meaning but also function to regulate social order. In her ethnography of
sexual relationships and sexual violence in Acholiland, Holly Porter has concep-
tualized this as ‘social harmony’, which, she argues, ‘denotes a state of “normal”
relations among the living and the dead, an idea of cosmological equilibrium, and
social balance of power and moral order’ (2017: 3, emphasis added). Social har-
mony is a relational concept, not a taxonomic classification. It is akin to what
Fuller (1971) described as a ‘programme for living together’ and informed bywhat
Dresch (2012: 1) describes as ‘the explicit use of generalizing concepts, and a
disposition to address in such terms the conduct of human life’. This is under-
pinned by a conscious morality that recognizes a common standard of behaviour
that has its own ‘normative terminology’ for expressing both the ‘oughts’ and
‘musts’ of conformity as well as the moral distinction between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’
(Hart 1994; cf. ibid: 12).
In Acholi, notions of the ‘normal’ human being and the ‘normal’ social setting
are pervasive. Both Porter (2017) and Finnstro¨m (2008) underline the importance
of achieving ‘good existence’ or ‘good surroundings’—pinymaber—and the extent
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to which this ideal is made possible through people and, by extension, relation-
ships being ‘normal’. This is a broadly universal aspiration, recalling Goffman’s
assertion that ‘we and those who do not depart negatively from the particular
expectations at issue I shall call the normals’ (1963: 15, emphasis in original).17
The English word ‘normal’ was a translation of a handful of related phrases.
‘Bedomaber’ wasmost common, literallymeaning ‘existingwell’, but also carrying
a broadermeaning: ‘proper coexistence in the community.’ Being a proper person,
a ‘human’ person has an overarching relational dimension: your individual be-
haviour has deep symbiotic associations with the material, social and cosmologic-
al health of your surroundings. As one man explained:
When people talk about normal, they look at your behaviour, how your behaviour
conforms to what is expected, so they would talk about bedomaber, meaning peace-
ful co-existence in the community; ngadi bedo ki dano maber, meaning so and so is
well conversant in relating to others in the community, ngeyo bedo I kin dano, liter-
ally meaning someone who understands and knows how relate with others in the
society, pe ki ayella mo ki keken, meaning does not have any problems (society
issues) with anyone ... and this can bring about kwo maber, meaning living well
with others.18
There is something approximating a moral schema, highly gendered, which forms
the basis of social understandings and contestations. In the 1960s, for example,
Anna Apoko wrote about the Acholi’s ‘ideal people’: those who are ‘liked and
valued by the whole community’ (1967: 47). A ‘successful man’ should have acres
of cotton, millet and sim sim. He should be a skilled hunter and his house must be
large and robust.19 Apoko recalls the songs composed by women to describe and
pay respect to such men: ‘Our Odai/The only great one/He was absent for a day/
and the house went to pieces’ (ibid.: 46). The individual character of the man is
celebrated in this short verse, but the emphasis is also on the way in which his
‘good existence’ modulates the ‘good surroundings’. Equally, there is a sense of
fragility, of things falling apart when the equilibrium is disrupted. An ideal situ-
ation, Okot p’Bitek explains, is when ‘things are normal, the society, thriving,
facing and overcoming crises’ (cf. Porter 2017: 3). This is only attainable through
respectful and appropriate coexistence both between the living and with the dead
(ibid.: 3). As one man explained:
I think normal . . . there is a point where there is no activity . . . you do not excite
people either in negative or positive, you are just there, you know, just there . . . if
your behaviour tends to the negative toomuch, then that is abnormal, and then if it
gets excitable toomuch, on the other side, it also attracts a description, so if you are a
plain simple person . . . then that is normal . . . if you do everything that is expected
within the community, you live a normal life. But if you deviate from that, there is a
lack of normalcy, deviant behaviour and deviation from established trends.20
Writing about the social mores and moral codes of any society raises more ques-
tions than it answers. The biggest risk is that we revert to degenerate cultural
essentialism or that we romanticize an ideal, rural form of social regulation that
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erases the contestation and the heterogeneity of social existence, everywhere. This
is all the more sensitive in the Acholi context, where the politics of social ‘facts’
have been so deeply intertwined with the politics of war and state formation in
Uganda.When people reflect on the war, and on mass displacement and encamp-
ment, they talk about how camp life undermined Acholi traditions, cultural prac-
tices and social institutions (Finnstro¨m 2008: 146). As a source of social unease, it
is important to remember that the degradation of prototypical Acholi tradition
and practices has been a perennial concern, and was written about extensively by
Girling in the mid-century, by Apoko in the 1960s, by p’Bitek in the 1970s and by
Behrend in the 1980s. The ideal of social harmony, as Porter argues, stays afloat
upon ‘a loosely constructed repertoire of contested norms’ that are anchored in
references to cik Acholi (unwritten moral principles) and Acholi macon (the olden
days). This way of seeing the world, ‘people just take it for granted’, explained a
young man. ‘That doesn’t mean it is uncontested,’ he continued, ‘you might dis-
agree with any aspect of it, but it is there.’
Moral Experience, Social Suffering and the Stigmatization of LRA Returnees
in Post-war Acholiland
In our interviews and focus groups, there were different aspects to broad-brush
narratives about returnees who have ‘not settled back well’ and are therefore
stigmatized as part of the moral experience of reconstructing ‘the normal’ and
protecting ‘what matters most’ in post-war relationships. Before these are
explored below, an important caveat is necessary. As already noted, there are
scores of studies detailing the prevalence of stigmatization and the harmful effects
it has on those at the receiving end in post-war northern Uganda. What follows
below is not an attempt to question these experiences or to seek to justify the
stigmatization of returnees in any normative sense. Rather, it is an effort to under-
stand and articulate how those doing the stigmatizing interpret their own collect-
ive and individual actions and what this can tell us about moral experience of
social suffering and social repair in our context.
Bad Behaviours and Unwanted Lifestyles
A perceived inability to contribute productively to village life: to work hard in the
fields and to be with respect for others generated stigmatization of male LRA
returnees. In a gerontocracy, where social currents are moving in different direc-
tions, young men are always treading the line of perceived social nonconformity.
The register is different for those who returned from the bush. There is an extra
spatial and moral dimension to their experience that make acts of ‘bad behaviour’
more threatening. The ‘bush’ has complex associations. On the one hand, it pro-
vides the firewood and game that sustain daily life in the village. But it is also a
dangerous moral space. It is believed that journeys into the bush must be under-
taken with care and vigilance because, in contradistinction to the home, in the
village, the bush was not a place of human habitation and order, but a turbulent,
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ungovernable place where wild animals roamed free and formidable cosmological
forces worked through and above nature.21
Despite plenty of evidence that life in the LRAwas highly regulated by rules and
codes, these tended to subvert ‘normal’ social practice and, in any case, were
inculcated in a context widely perceived as inimical to order. The notion of a
disciplinary system in a space so formless and unpredictable as the ‘bush’ was
paradoxical to most people. People who had not experienced life with the LRA
imagined it in terms of its rawness: its lack of boundaries and lack of restraint and
were deeply concerned about the transmission of ‘bush’ behaviour back into the
village. Not surprisingly, on their return, those who have spent time with the LRA
are ‘monitored’ carefully.
People made reference to ‘two categories’ of male returnees. It was said that
those who came home and ‘behaved well’ were not stigmatized.22 But those who
engaged in petty crime, aggressive behaviour, drunkenness and those who were
idle and refused toworkwere not trusted and could not be accepted.A youngman
explained:
Those that are not finger pointed at live in the rightful way according to the set
values and norms of society, but those that are being finger pointed at do not listen
to the teachings of society and do not respect the societies values and norms.23
This sentiment was widely echoed. As a youth leader working in Gulu municipal-
ity explained: ‘once they came home [from the bush], their ways of life do not
match with the community’. Returnees have to demonstrate that they can live a
‘good kind of life’, that they have a ‘good character’, otherwise they will ‘always be
finger pointed and even avoided in the community’.24
‘Aggressive behaviours’, often described as the ‘bush mentality’, were widely
cited and commonly illustrated via the spectre of the returnee who intimidates
community members by proudly boasting that violence committed in the bush
could easily be perpetrated back home: ‘I can beat you, I am from the bush, and do
you know what I did there? I killed so many people therefore killing you is quite
simple.’25 Linked to this is a concern about returnees stealing and destroying other
people’s property—another behaviour learnt from the bush, where the LRA
would loot people’s food and belongings during attacks and ambushes. Those
who engage in aggressive behaviour and crime are judged severely and command
little sympathy: ‘it is why people still stigmatize them, and say this person has not
reformed,’ explained a young woman.26
There are also those returnees who ‘remain idle’, who drink too much and do
not dig, and whose lifestyle is perceived as disorderly and parasitic. They might be
referred to as ‘defeated in life’, living a ‘kind of hopeless life’, and are also com-
pared unfavourably to those who have returned from the bush and ‘behaved well’:
The reason as to why it [stigmatization] is still happening is that there are other
people who are still living a kind of life which is not all that normal . . . for the others
who are not being stigmatised . . . you cannot even say that they were once in the
bush because the kind of life they are living are good and nokind of drunkenness . . ..
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And they have become an example to the other returnees to live that kind of exem-
plary life. And when you don’t live those kind of hopeless life, people just forget
about you quickly, about your returning from the bush.27
Those returnees who drink and do not engage in economic activity are maligned
for transgressing social norms and expectations. They may not be feared to the
same degree as those described as aggressive, and their behaviour is more easily
camouflaged, because lots ofmen were described as ‘idle drunkards’ and the camp
gave rise to the same problems. But, ultimately, they are also socially devalued
because of their ‘not being normal’.
Whether because of a lack of repentance and threatening behaviour or idleness
and drinking, there was a common view that ‘moral obligations’ central to the
regulation and balance of village life were being violated by certain returnees and
further that, because these obligations were ‘existentially indispensable to constitut-
ing subjects in the first place’ (Englund 2008: 45), these returnees had—to varying
degrees—stopped being ‘human’. It was common to hear people saying that LRA
returnees should ‘be as humans’, to ‘live like humans’. Heald (1998: 215) writes
about this in relation to the Gisu in eastern Uganda: those who are ‘confused’,
‘disobedient’ and disrespectful become ‘animal like’; they are seen as having ‘opted
out of responsive human society’ because ‘rule following . . . provides the way in
which the essential constitution of the person can be judged’ (emphasis added).
Stalked by Bad Spirits
Cosmological forces—‘Acholi spirit worlds’—are deeply embedded in social
exchanges and relations of power (Victor and Porter 2017: 592). Whilst people
ascribe labels to spiritual phenomena, definitions are fluid and mutable. In their
study of ‘spiritual pollution’ amongst LRA returnees, Victor and Porter (2017:
594) write that ‘Ajwani, as a broadly applied term for cosmological upset, are the
“dirty things”’ . . . often instantiated by gross misfortune or the presence of ran-
corous spirit forces’.
The most common manifestation of ajwani is referred to as cen. Cen refers
broadly to those spirits of the dead that seek vengeance. The malign influence
of cen lies partly in its restless and diffusive quality, which threatens to permeate,
pollute and propagate unless appeased. When we asked what cen means, a com-
mon response was ‘to be possessed by evil spirits’. Some spoke of ajiji, ‘the after-
shock of something’; others used more religious terminology such as ‘to be
haunted by the souls of the departed’ or ‘demons’.
LRA returnees are widely suspected to carry cen because it can be provoked
when a person perpetrates or witnesses a killing and/or mishandles or steps upon a
corpse. Because of what they saw and did in their time with the LRA, they are
censured: ‘you with your cen in your head’. People are labelled as ‘you have some-
thing in your eyes’; or ‘there is something that attracts/comes into you’. The word
‘libo’, which was directly translated as ‘sneaking’ or ‘stalking’, was used to describe
the malevolent quality of the bad spirits: ‘like when a poacher tries to get an
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animal,’ one man explained, ‘there is something that is stalking you, and when it
takes over you, you become violent . . . you are being stalked by the spirits.’28
This represents a significant danger to the community as a whole because cen
‘contaminates’ relations and can bring misfortune to the wider community
(Meinert and Whyte 2017: 273, 279). There is therefore a pressing need to chase
away or appease the spirits through ritual or prayer. As one man explained:
In Acholi culture, when you are to go somewhere and took a long period of time . . .
they will say that you have come back with bad omens . . . or you have killed
someone . . . or you have been stepping on corpse of people while in captivity, it
might be that the bad spirits caught you. So, therewill be a cleansing ritual, whereby
goats might be slaughtered so as to repair what happened that was bad. And the
religious leaders pray for the victims whom they just think will be cleansed by the
power of the Lord.
Whether through traditional ritual or prayer, appeasing the spirits is a flexible,
uncertain and processual undertaking (Baines 2009; Meinert and Whyte 2017;
Victor and Porter 2017). Problems linked to cen might continue or resurface, so
that afflicted returnees remain under careful watch. Broader perceptions of peace-
ful coexistence with the spirit world were fragile and contingent on things being
‘normal’. One man explained:
there remains a degree of suspicion and that suspicion can be triggered by observa-
tion of people’s traits . . . if the person is not behaving, or if the behaviour contradicts
what the society expects of him then the stigma would still continue, but . . . if they
come back and start living a normal life, then they would assume the cleansing
worked.29
It is in the social and temporally unpredictable space between abomination, con-
taminant cen and the search for appeasement and spiritual balance that the stig-
matization of returnees becomes possible. The hazards of the contemporary
environment render LRA returnees who exhibit unusual behaviour, or who exist
in proximity to misfortune, as a clear source of social danger. As one women
explained:
there are those who will say, what she or he did in the bush still haunts them . . . so
while people do stay with them . . .. they are alert.30
‘Bad spirits’, explained an older man, ‘are fighting with our souls’ and ‘the idea
and thinking that something is going to happen will cause much damage . . . and
finger pointing’.31 Here, stigmatization becomesmeaningful as ‘moral experience’
in the present, rather than as a ‘free-floating’ phenomenon linked to a specific act
or a historic event (see Kleinman 1997: 324).
The Issue of Land Is Bad
In his writing on moral experience, social suffering and stigma, Kleinman argues
that ‘it is in local worlds that the relational elements of social existence in which
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people have the greatest stake are played out’ (ibid.: 327). What is at stake—or
‘what really matters’—diverges evenwithin the local worlds we studied. As argued
above, for many, it was the social requirement for returnees to ‘live well’ and
coexist productively and peacefully with the community and the spirit world. In
other instances, however, community members wilfully instrumentalized a per-
son’s status as a ‘returnee’ in order to reject customary claims to land and resour-
ces and secure ‘what mattered most’, usually as part of the political economy of
land disputes, which are rife across the Acholi region in the aftermath of mass
displacement. As Whyte et al. (2013: 294) explain, these are driven by a combin-
ation of post-conflict factors: the commodification of land; concerns about land-
grabbing by, for example, powerful state actors and agro-business; variation in the
interpretation of ‘traditional’ land tenure; disruption of customary boundaries
during displacement and, indeed, the doubling of the northern Ugandan popula-
tion between 1980 and 2002—an upward curve that shows no signs of settling
down any time soon.
As the conflict ended, camps were decommissioned and IDPs and returnees
were routinely told by international agencies and the government to ‘go back to
where the war found you’ but this presented a profound set of challenges (ibid.:
285). Claims to land are regulated through patrilineal social relations, which are
affirmed and protected through social institutions, most clearly customary mar-
riage, and, relatedly, through kinship links strong enough to guarantee your social
position. This customary tenure system was heavily disrupted by conflict and
displacement.
The impact this has had on women returning from the LRA and their children
born in the bush has been widely studied (see e.g. Baines and Stewart 2011; Baines
and Gauvin 2013; Amone-P’Olak et al. 2016; Denov and Lakor 2017; Mukasa
2017; Atim et al. 2018; Kiconco and Nthakomwa 2018). But land insecurity
impacts heavily upon male returnees too. It limits their access to income-gener-
ation and livelihood resources, but alsomakes itmuch harder for them to fulfil the
ideals associated with being an Acholi man: being able to provide for, and to
protect, your family. The monetary value now attached to land, combined with
its relative scarcity and a population increase, means those without the most ro-
bust evidence of patrilineal descent are vulnerable to exclusion (Mckibben and
Bean 2010; Hopwood and Atkinson 2013). Part of the problem is that ‘the
strength of the patrilineal argument depends on the strength of the protagonist’
and, because somany returnees lost parents and close relatives during the conflict,
they now have ‘weak ormissing links’ (Whyte et al. 2013: 298).Without a father or
a trusted uncle demonstrating your ‘first-order link’ to the land under question,
you remain highly vulnerable to exclusion (ibid.).
During our interviews and discussions, the stigmatization of LRA returnees
was linked to ‘land matters’ and a communal concern that returnees ‘have come
home to take land’. Others acknowledged the widespread problem of community
members ‘bullying [returnees] on land’ and excluding them from family discus-
sions around ‘land matters’. Returnees whose parents had died were most vulner-
able to this kind of treatment because, as one woman explained, often relatives
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‘will not show him the piece of land that was for his father’.32 In such cases, the
returnee’s identity is brandished against him in the struggle for scarce or valuable
resources. The available evidence confirms this, pointing to the fact that many
LRA returnees give up on securing a livelihood at ‘home’ and migrate to Gulu, or
trading centres further afield, in search of employment.33
Bad treatment by relatives had a knock-on effect on how returnees were viewed
by the broader community. As one man explained:
the returnees that have been successfully reintegrated into the community, well, it
solidly depends . . . on how their families have been taking them, for instance, giving
them land for cultivation . . . they will give you the love of the family, share things
together, and the returnee will know that he is being loved and taken care of.34
This ‘good family background’ will help the returnee to be ‘reintegrated into the
community well’. There is an Acholi saying that goes ‘we see how to beat a dog
from its owner’. Those who returned to find close relatives dead, and the land they
were staying either ‘grabbed’ or under the control of more distant family or clan
members, are more likely to be stigmatized by the wider community. If your own
family refused you access to land and rejected your presence, then there was a
feeling that ‘if the family cannot be bothered, can we really have faith in this
person?’.35 Because this level of rejection is perceived to be ‘extreme’, it aroused
suspicions, not only about the returnee whose ‘behaviour could have been un-
acceptable’, but also the family, illustrated by another proverb shared with us:
‘witchcraft begins at home’, more loosely used to warn that ‘if the family is doing
bad things, the child will also do bad things’.
The Functions of Stigmatization: Re-constituting ‘What Matters Most’
So far, we have seen that LRA returnees are stigmatized because they exhibit
behaviour that deviates from social norms and threatens social order and/or be-
cause they represent a strain on scarce material resources in contexts marked by
serious poverty. There is fluidity between the different factors driving stigmatiza-
tion because it occurs as part of moral experience ‘in the inter-subjective space
between people at the level of words, gestures, meanings, feelings etc. during en-
gagementwith what matters most’ (Yang et al. 2007 1532, emphasis added). ‘What
matters most’ might be ensuring that the returnee exists peacefully and respect-
fully with the community andwith the spirit world, or itmight be ensuring that the
returnee does not pose a threat to land claims. Because of this, stigmatization—the
social process by which an LRA returnee is ‘devalued’—has a range of social
functions, depending on how and why it happens. Below, we elaborate more on
the social function of stigmatization in our research sites.
Community Warning Systems and Regulating Village Governance
Stigmatization or ‘finger-pointing’ was described as a ‘warning to the commu-
nity’—away of ensuring people knew about your past but, more importantly, any
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dangers youmight present now: ‘Someone who had not known about you will get
to know when you are stigmatised.’36 Many people said they felt frightened of
LRA returnees, particularly those who exhibited aggressive behaviour. One man
expressed a common concern to us that
communitymembers . . .have the fear that these returneesmight again dobad things
on them, thus they must first of all stay away from him or her, because to prevent is
not to fear.37
When the function of stigmatization was cast as a community warning system, it
extended to excluding ‘abnormal’ returnees from the governance and economy of
village life. Being excluded from farming groups and saving and loans groups, as
well as from discussion of family issues, community social gatherings and collect-
ive village meetings, had a deliberately negative effect on social and economic
standing within the village. ‘In Acholi’, it was explained:
if people are going for any gathering they tend to leave you and they will not inform
you . . .. People are not happy with you so they don’t tell you what is in the
community.38
This exclusion might also extend to engagement in external development and
NGO projects. Several people told us that, when ‘projects’ are brought to the
village, those returnees with an ‘unacceptable lifestyle’ will not be included.
Stigmatization, argued one young man, functioned to ‘limit’ returnees from
normally accessing the things that others get . . . they don’t get assistance and sup-
port that the others get to help them live together with the rest . . . like for instance
when the government brought the NUSAF . . . they are not included in such groups
... they are even excluded out of any family talk issues but they will just find out that
something happening in the family without their consent.39
On the other hand, those returnees perceived as ‘normal’ faced few problemswhen
it came inclusion in village life:
If you love people, relate well with them and share with them, no one can exclude
you from the society ... but rather wouldwant you involved in all the activities of the
community. They say ‘write his or her name to take part in this particular project’ no
one will exclude you but if you have unacceptable lifestyle then it is impossible.40
In all of our research sites, people spoke of returnees in authority positions in the
village. One older man talked of ‘several local council leaders’, who were retur-
nees: ‘if you are to do an investigation,’ he said, ‘youwill realize that all were killers
but now they are good people.’ Others explained that ‘when it comes to leadership,
the community members look at the capability of an individual, not whether the
person was in the bush or not’.41 Aside from local councillors, people named, for
example, Sunday-school teachers, savings and loans group chairmen and clan
guards. This of course challenges the narrative that LRA returnees uniformly
face stigmatization and social exclusion and is worthy of further research.
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Stigmatic Shaming and Reintegrative Shaming
In many instances, stigmatization functioned to exclude returnees from the eco-
nomic and social fabric of village life. Exclusion, however, is not the only function
of stigmatization. Communities also stigmatize as part of social processes
designed to reintegrate returnees back into the fold of village life. In his book,
Crime, Shame and Reintegration, Braithwaite (1989: 100) defines shaming as ‘all
social processes of expressing disapproval which have the intention or effect of
invoking remorse in the person being shamed’. He goes on to make a crucial
distinction—highly relevant in the Acholi context—between ‘stigmatic shaming’
and ‘reintegrative shaming’. ‘Stigmatic shaming’ is exclusionary because it is
degrading and humiliating, and deliberately ‘makes things worse’ for the wrong-
doer by treating them like a ‘bad person’, whereas ‘reintegrative shaming’ ‘com-
municates shame to a wrongdoer’ in order to reintegrate them back into society.
When respondents described it as having a ‘resocializing’ function, stigmatiza-
tionwas associatedwith a broader set of cultural practices thatmade itmeaningful
as something that exists above and beyond pure finger-pointing, ‘back-biting’,
gossip and exclusion. Grouping stigma together with other important social con-
cepts related to shame, one elder from an area where there had been a serious
massacre during the LRA war explained:
The reason as to why people are stigmatising and shaming [the returnees] is because
the kind of lifestyle they are living is not accepted by the community and so that one
helps a person change.
Another explained that
there are some people, if you don’t beat on them they don’t learn, but if you beat on
them, they will realize, so stigma is good because it reminds them that I should stay
in the family like this, and respect the community.
In this interaction, shame becomes a ‘central possibility’ (Goffman 1963: 18) and is
understood to contribute to an individual’s perception of his or her actions as
morally wrong and thus playing an important function in the reassertion and
regulation of ‘normal’ social relations.
The correct balance is delicate here. As was explained to us: returnees should
not have too much shame, but they should also not be shameless. The word most
commonly used was lawic, which also means to feel shy. Returnees should have
shame ‘like a car should have brakes’; however, too much shame will make them
bedo keni or stay alone, or poke, which means to isolate yourself from a group,
which creates suspicion.
Traditionally, we were reminded that public, reintegrative shaming played an
important role in Acholi society. As one woman explained: ‘many ways are used to
help people learn from their mistakes and change accordingly.’42 For example,
people ‘feared’ the village nanga players, who would compose songs about indi-
viduals who had behaved badly with the broader purpose of trying to ‘reform’
them. As one man explained: ‘any deviant behaviours, bad behaviours in the
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community, they would immediately compose a song about you and would sing
and everyonewould listen and laugh about it.’43 This ‘joking’ elementwas also very
important. As the Heald noted in eastern Uganda, ‘joking relationships’, which
often involved ‘tentative abuse’ and a ‘combination of friendliness and antagno-
sim’, set ‘the parameters for moral discourse and behaviour’ (Radcliffe Brown
1952: 91; cf. Heald 1998: 216–217). Often, explained one man, if you are in a
bad situation or you have done a bad thing, people will ‘laugh at you, not in a
way that they are mocking you or that they are being callous about it’, more he
explained, as a way of dealing with individual deviance and then ‘accepting you’.44
One group gave us lots of examples of songs and riddles that singled people out
for a range of moral and social transgressions, from stealing to a lack of personal
hygiene, but ultimately had an educative, socializing function. It meant that your
wrongdoing was out in the open—that the community took it seriously, but also
wanted to help you see the error of your ways and improve. In the ‘olden days’, we
were told, this kind of ‘shaming’ was good because it would help ‘people to start
leading better lives’. The right level of shame amongst LRA returnees, not debil-
itating shame, but not shamelessness, was healthy and would help the community
manage the moral implications of their time in the LRA and any worrying be-
haviour back home.
What unites stigmatic shaming and reintegrative shaming of LRA returnees is
that both processes allowed people some agency and control over how to deal with
LRA returnees, and, by extension, how to manage their own feelings about the
war and its legacy.Manywho had experienced LRA violence directly or indirectly
explained how their grief and anger had been censored and suppressed by the
stringency of the Amnesty Act; the demands for forgiveness and forgetting; and a
lack of other forms of justice. Akello (2019) writes about ‘acts of resistance by
survivors’ who feel trapped by what they regard as state-sanctioned impunity and
the criminalization of victims who dare to confront returnees. Stigmatization of
returnees—whether exclusionary or reintegrative—becomes part of the moral
experience of asserting some agency in a situation characterized by disciplinary
forms reintegration promotion, which may contribute to, rather than assuage,
social suffering. This is not to question or negate the harmful impacts of stigma-
tization on those at the receiving end. Nor is it to suggest that many of those
abducted by the LRA do not also feel a keen sense of injustice about what
happened to them and how life is now. Rather, it is to point out that, like any
social practice, stigmatization carries logics and functions that need to be
understood.
Conclusion
Whether through the Amnesty Law, NGO ‘sensitizations’ or religious forgive-
ness, the focus of anti-stigma efforts in the Acholi context has been on pro-
gramming or preaching the stigmatization of LRA returnees out of existence.
This is based on a narrow conception of stigmatization as an epiphenomenal
practice that exists beyond cultural and social norms and processes.
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Interventions to reduce stigma have been based on individualized notions of
stigmatization as a form of unreasonable, untenable behaviour that can be
addressed though programming. This programming has focused on ‘educat-
ing’ communities about the innocence of returnees and ‘disciplining’ com-
munities through attempts to suppress stigmatizing behaviour. This is
despite the fact that, across contexts, there is no empirical link between
increased ‘knowledge’ and a reduction in stigmatization (Gronholm et al.
2017). As evidence-based studies elsewhere have shown, ‘continuing to focus
on education likely represents a waste of valuable resources’ that might be
deployed elsewhere, for example to address the root causes of the social suffer-
ing that produces the conditions for the most harmful forms of stigmatization
(ibid.; Pescosolido and Martin 2015: 101). Disciplinary techniques meanwhile
serve to intensify people’s feelings of disenfranchisement and powerlessness in
negotiating the reintegration of returnees.
Contrary to the logic of anti-stigma interventions, our findings suggest that
stigmatization is deeply embedded in the ‘moral experience’ of post-war Acholi
‘local worlds’. It serves to regulate the presence and behaviour of LRA returnees
in order to restore ‘normality’ in the context of sustained social suffering.
Depending on ‘what matters most’ and ‘what is crucially at stake’, it can happen
as part of the ‘moral experience’ of appeasing cen; protecting communitymembers
from physical attacks; guaranteeing access to land; regulating village governance;
or a combination of these things. As such, stigmatization manifests in different
ways and carries different functions: sometimes it is exclusionary, at other times it
is reintegrative. This umbrella term can be either a ‘thick’ or a ‘thin’ descriptor,
depending on the circumstance.
While is true that anti-stigma programmes in Acholiland have raised awareness
about the undesirability of stigmatization, this has not translated neatly into a
reduction in the social processes associated with it because these are part of the
moral experience of everyday life. As Yang et al. (2007: 1528) argue:
this is what makes stigma so dangerous, durable and difficult to curb . . . for the
stigmatizer, stigma seems to be an effective and natural response, emergent not only
as an act of self-preservation or psychological defence, but also in the existential and
moral experience that one is being threatened.
This is not to justify stigmatization of LRA returnees, nor is it to underestimate
the harmful effects of stigma on this heterogeneous group. Rather, it is to argue
that community reintegration in spaces of social suffering can only be helped by
interventions that seek to understand first and foremost how and why stigmatiza-
tion functions in social relationships and ‘local worlds’ rather than addressing it
abstractly as a conflict-induced malfunction that can be modified and fixed
through education and discipline.
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